Kettei term
Trigger register and watchkeeping
A trigger register lists the triggers an endeavour is watching, each marked watching, fired, resolved or overdue. Watchkeeping is the regular reading of that register, an item of no more than 20 minutes inside a meeting the team already holds.
Kettei requires a trigger to lie inside a decision's validity boundary, the conditions under which that decision remains valid. Each trigger is written with a signal, a threshold, an owner, a response window and a response rule. An endeavour keeps its triggers in a trigger register, and the register is read in the weekly watch.
Watchkeeping adds no meeting. It is one short item inside a meeting the team already holds, and it certifies that each Watchcard has been reviewed for deviance. The cadence is weekly by default, and event triggers do not wait for it. The Watchcard triggers the AHA (pronounced A-Hey), and it does not record the answer.
Trigger register decay
Trigger register decay is the failure mode in which a register of triggers degrades from adaptive sensing to compliance checking. Triggers survive on paper after the watching has lapsed, and when one fires the review is deferred. A trigger that has lost its sensor produces the same silence as one whose condition has not been met, so a register can look healthy at the moment it has stopped working.
The case
Equifax inspected the traffic to its consumer dispute portal with a device that needed a valid certificate. The certificate expired on 31 January 2016, and by default the device let traffic continue through to the portal uninspected. A majority staff report of the US House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, published in December 2018, reconstructs what followed.
Attackers entered the portal on 13 May 2017, and over 76 days ran about 9,000 queries. By the committee's count Equifax had no visibility into the portal's network traffic for 19 months.
At the time of the breach the company had let at least 324 certificates expire. An internal tracker entry dated 20 January 2017 recorded that devices were "missing certificates, limiting visibility to web based attacks".
In March 2017 a senior security analyst wrote that Equifax needed to define who owns certificate "care and feeding". The committee's diagnosis was "a lack of accountability and no clear lines of authority" in the IT management structure. A monthly meeting of IT and security leaders had certificate deployment on its tracking list throughout.
What a trigger would have asked
Written as a trigger, the certificate would take its expiry date as the signal, with one named owner holding a response window that opens a set number of days before it. That trigger would have come due in January 2016 and come back as overdue, week after week, until someone closed it. The committee's record does not settle whether that would have caught the attack in May 2017.
The question to ask
A register worth keeping is tested from the condition backwards, one trigger at a time. Which of the triggers on this register would fire if its condition were met today?
Read the original
Blind for 19 Months was published on Kettei on Substack on 26 October 2026, and is gathered in Kettei Decision Digest 4: Failures of Stopping, Part 1. The Watchcard and the Watchlist are set out at The Kettei Card and the Watchcard.
Sources
- US House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (2018) The Equifax Data Breach. Majority Staff Report, 115th Congress, December 2018. Establishes the expired certificate, the 19 months, the tracker entry and the committee's diagnosis.
From the essay Blind for 19 Months on Kettei on Substack, 26 October 2026.

Kettei
The Discipline of Governed Intent
